

AFF Answers

2AC No Link

The plan is a non-sensitive issue

Erickson 7

Andrew S., assistant professor and founding member of the China Maritimes Studies Institute in the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College, "New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses," China Security, Vol. 3 No. 4 Autumn 2007, pp. 40-61

A wide variety of **non-sensitive cooperation areas** will remain the most viable starting point and **can likely continue regardless of the state of U.S.-China relations. These include tourism, civilian academic conferences and exchanges, Track II diplomacy** (i.e., by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), **commercial utilization of new maritime resources and technologies, environmental protection, meteorology** (e.g., typhoon and tsunami detection) **and** certain types of **scientific research**. For these areas, **the private sector and non-governmental organizations can continue to play a major role.**

2AC No Link—Ocean Heg =/= Zero Sum

China doesn't perceive ocean supremacy as zero-sum—not threatened by the plan

Reuters 14

Reuters, 6/21/14, "'China urges peaceful development of seas, says conflict leads to 'disaster,'"uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/21/uk-southchinasea-china-idUKKBN0EW07J20140621, 6/28/14, MRM

(Reuters) - **China**, involved in a growing dispute with its neighbours over the energy-rich South China Sea, **wants to promote peaceful development of the oceans, Premier Li Keqiang said**, warning **conflicts** in the past had **only brought "disaster for humanity"**. China claims almost the entire ocean, rejecting rival claims to parts of it from Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei in one of Asia's most intractable disputes and a possible flashpoint. It also has a long-running dispute with Japan in the East China Sea. **"China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development** and firmly oppose any act of hegemony in maritime affairs," Li said at a maritime summit in Greece on Friday in comments carried by China's Foreign Ministry website on Saturday. **"Developing the oceans through cooperation has helped many nations flourish, while resorting to conflict to fight over the sea has only brought disaster for humanity."**

2AC Containment Good Link Turn

Containing China's maritime provocations key to stop further expansion

Hatcher 13

Jaimie, Australian Command and Staff College with a Masters of Management in Defence Studies degree, Australian Defence Force Academy, Air Warfare specialist, China's Growing Indian Ocean Maritime Interests: Sowing the Seed of Conflict?, October Soundings No. 2

If the political and economic future of China is to be assured as forecast earlier, it will be necessary for other states to adopt policies that dissuade China from becoming a revolutionary and risk acceptant rising power. There remains, however, emerging challenges for China, which contest the feasibility for a 'peaceful rise' and/or 'harmonious world'. Although Oscar Kwok argues convincingly that China's foreign policy of harmonious rise is an abiding policy based on Confucian heritage, **the behaviour of other states, the likely decline of Confucianism appeal amongst the growing Chinese middle class and the growing contest for energy refute his case.**^[94] **China's national goals are therefore poised to tend revolutionary and thus translate into a national willingness to take greater strategic risks.** 'Harmony' is an idealistic view and while attractive philosophically, **the social and political transformation required and associated foreign policy will undermine faith in a strategy of peaceful rise. China is therefore behaving tactically in the Indian Ocean region and is sowing the seeds of conflict.** Other states too are sowing the seeds of conflict. It is strategically essential for Indian Ocean states to signal clearly their intent to avoid strategic miscalculation, potentially leading war, while the international world order is rebalanced. Is it timely to revisit past international interest to establish the Indian Ocean region as a zone of peace?

Chinese maritime domination destabilizes Asia-Pacific region—ends security guarantees and causes prolif

O'Rourke 14

Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, "Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China," June 6, Congressional Research Service

As China emerges as a major world power, observers are assessing what kind of international actor China will be. **China's actions in asserting and defending its maritime territorial and EEZ disputes in the ECS and SCS could influence** assessments that observers might make on issues such as **China's approach to settling disputes** between states (including whether China views force and coercion as acceptable means for settling such disputes, and consequently whether China believes that "might makes right"), China's views toward the meaning and application of international law, and whether China views itself more as a stakeholder and defender of the current international order, or alternatively, more as a revisionist power that will seek to change elements of that order that it does not like.¶ **Security Structure of Asia-Pacific Region¶ Chinese domination over or control of its near-seas region could have significant implications for the security structure of the Asia-Pacific region.** In particular, **Chinese domination over or control of its near-seas area could greatly complicate the ability of the United States to fulfill its obligations to Taiwan** under the Taiwan Relations Act (H.R. 2479/P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979).⁵⁷ **It could also complicate** the ability of the **United States** to fulfill its **obligations under security** and defense **treaties** with other countries in the region, **particularly Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.**⁵⁸ More generally, **it could complicate the ability of the United States to operate U.S. forces in the Western Pacific for various purposes, including maintaining regional stability, conducting engagement and partnership-building operations, responding to crises, and executing war plans.** **Developments such as these could in turn encourage countries in the region to reexamine their own defense programs** and foreign policies, potentially leading to a further change in the region's security structure.

2AC Containment Good Link Turn—China Modeled

China's maritime claims dictate international acceptance of freedom of the seas precedent

O'Rourke 14

Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, "Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China," June 6, Congressional Research Service

Another key element of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II **is the treatment of the world's seas under international law as international waters** (i.e., as a global commons), and freedom of operations in international waters. **The principal is** often referred in shorthand as **freedom of the seas**. It is also sometimes referred to as freedom of navigation, although this term can be defined—particularly by parties who might not support freedom of the seas—in a narrow fashion, to include merely the freedom to navigate (i.e., pass through) sea areas, as opposed to the freedom for conducting various activities at sea. A more complete way to refer to the principal, as stated in DOD's annual FON report, is "the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law."⁶² The principal that most of the world's seas are to be treated under international law as international waters dates back hundreds of years.⁶³ Some observers are concerned that **China's maritime territorial claims**, particularly as shown in the map of the nine-dash line, appear to **challenge to the principal that the world's seas are to be treated under international law as international waters. If such a challenge were to gain acceptance in the SCS region, it would have** broad **implications** for the United States and other countries not only in the SCS, but **around the world, because** international law is universal in application, and a **challenge to a principal of international law in one part of the world, if accepted, can serve as a precedent for challenging it in other parts of the world. Overturning the principal of freedom of the seas, so that** significant portions of **the seas could be appropriated as national territory, would overthrow hundreds of years of international legal tradition** relating to the legal status of the world's oceans.⁶⁴

2AC Containment Good Link Turn—India War Impact

China-India disputes over the Indian Ocean escalate to war

Mizokami 14

[Kyle Mizokami; Political Writer for The National Interest; "Five Indian Weapons of War China should fear"; June 21, 2014; <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-indian-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10714>; JW]

India and China have been neighbors for thousands of years, and have traditionally enjoyed good relations. Only recently in their mutual history have the two sides come to blows. Despite that long peaceful history, the brief 1962 border war and subsequent disagreements over territory have chilled relations between the two. **China's recent push to acquire what it considers historically Chinese territory has not been lost on India, and New Delhi has been stepping up modernization of its armed forces.** Although China soundly beat India in the 1962 war, the armies of both sides are now more evenly matched and the result could easily be a stalemate. **If India and China were to come to blows, the real war would be fought at sea.** **China imports large amounts of foreign oil, and two thirds of that must pass through the Indian Ocean.** India sits astride the sea lanes providing China with energy. In the event of increased tensions the Indian Navy could impose essentially a blockade on China of vital shipping from the Persian Gulf and Africa. **Such a move could force the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to travel thousands of miles around the southern end of Asia, into the Indian Ocean to confront Indian naval forces.** The fate of the Chinese economy would be in the balance and could escalate to include many different domains of warfare. With that in mind, here are our five weapons of such a potential conflict that China would fear most.

China-US war in the Indian Ocean likely

Mizokami 6/28

[Kyle Mizokami; Political Writer for The National Interest; "Five Chinese Weapons of War India Should Fear"; June 28, 2014; <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-chinese-weapons-war-india-should-fear-10774>; JW]

Last week I discussed in these pages five Indian weapons of war China should fear. This week it's time to turn the tables and lose the Twitter followers I gained after the article's publication. As I noted previously, **the mountainous terrain on the Chinese-Indian border makes a land war difficult to prosecute and relatively easy to defend.** The decisive war would take place at sea as **India--sitting astride the shipping lanes providing a significant part of China's energy--could set up a naval blockade and essentially strangle Beijing's economy.** **China would have to sortie the People's Liberation Army Navy into the Indian Ocean to break the blockade.** That having been said, **China has ways to asymmetrically attack India and fight across multiple domains of conflict to entice India to back down.** Beijing's large fleet of conventionally armed ballistic missiles could be used to bombard Indian territory and compel India to a ceasefire. China could even argue that as an Indian blockade harms China's economy, Indian economic targets, such as factories, refineries, and energy reserves would be fair game. **Beijing's ongoing development of hypersonic weapons will add a new level of complexity to such an attack.**

No US-Sino Ocean War

No impact- China will not seek conflict with US—they want a peaceful maritime policy

Lou 14

[Chunhao Lou; Political and Economics Writer for East Asia Forum; “Power politics in the Indian Ocean: Don’t exaggerate the China threat”; February 1, 2014; <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/tag/united-states-of-america/>; JW]

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena. **Recent discourse has focused on China’s naval ambitions in the IOR and potential US–India cooperation in response to China’s presence.** To some extent, the ‘China Factor’ is one explanation behind the recent improvement of US–India relations, as both the US and India are anxious about Chinese entry into IOR. Particularly in India, many strategists are concerned about the imaginary Chinese ‘string of pearls strategy’. However, an in-depth analysis of the three countries’ strategic outlook could lead to a different conclusion.¶ **The perception of the ‘China threat’ mainly derives from a fear of China’s different political system and its astonishing rise, both in scale and speed. But when analysed in relation to intention, capability, or aspiration, it is clear that the potential threat of**

China has always been over-exaggerated. China’s strategic focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean. It **lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy India’s geographic advantages.** More importantly, **China has traditionally had a peaceful maritime policy. Even when China was a pre-eminent maritime power, it promoted peace and commerce,** as was clearly illustrated during the Ming Dynasty.¶ **Today, China’s naval strategy is to ensure a ‘harmonious sea’ through capacity building and international cooperation. China views the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle.** China’s seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world, particularly the Indian Ocean. Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in IOR littorals is part of China’s economy-oriented ‘Going Global’ strategy. **Although it is frequently argued that China should and must develop into becoming a strong maritime power, the Chinese government has always emphasised that their maritime power is totally different from Western-style maritime power.**

Many Chinese scholars even warn against having a military presence in the IOR.¶ Nonetheless, the US and India have a history of having different Indian Ocean strategies. Although China’s presence will always promote US–India cooperation, **the democratic peace theory will not supersede realistic politics, and the differing interests of the US and India in the IOR will be difficult to reconcile.** The US and India have had contradictory strategic policies regarding the Indian Ocean since the Cold War era. In the 1960s, when the US wanted to inherit Britain’s influence in IOR, India opposed the “theory of power vacuum” and instead supported the idea of an ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’. During the 1971 Indo–Pakistan War, the US dispatched its Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, causing great concern from the Indian side.¶ India’s view of the IOR can be summarised as a sense of crisis and destiny. Regarding the sense of crisis, Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages between Indian Ocean and India’s national security. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued that India’s independence and survival depended on India’s control of the Indian Ocean. India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007) highlighted that ‘whatever happens in the IOR can affect our national security and is of interest to us’. As for destiny, India’s unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of India’s aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into India’s Ocean. Many Indian strategists view the Indian Ocean as India’s ‘rightful domain’ and contend that ‘India will have to play a very large role (in the Indian Ocean) if the prospects for peace and cooperation are to grow’.¶ In contrast, **the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean.** Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, **the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power. In accordance with the shift of the world power balance, the US will seek to sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean.** The US has taken many measures to achieve this goal, including strengthening its presences in Diego Garcia and Bahrain, updating its military cooperation with established allies, and setting up forward military networks to control key choke points.¶ **Thus, although confrontations and conflicts between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of China’s maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different results.** Given the

China's policy aims, intent and capability, **China cannot afford to challenge** either **the United States** or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India-US potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterise the IOR landscape than the 'China threat'.

No impact – US and China will cooperate – no risk of militarization.

Paal '12

[Douglas, August, Vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. e was on the National Security Council staffs of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush between 1986 and 1993 as director of Asian Affairs and then as senior director and special assistant to the president.¶ , Dangerous Shoals: U.S. Policy in the South China Sea¶ <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=397>]

In view of the potential disruptive effects brought about by China's rise and its neighbors' responses, **the United States has a further interest in a peaceful settlement.** Moreover, **reinforcement of the rule of international law is in America's interest in reducing the cost of maintaining stability** and managing change going forward.¶ Today, **the South China Sea is not at the "Sudetenland" moment of the twenty-first century,** which calls for standing up to aggression and the rejection of appeasement. **China has not militarized its foreign policy and does not appear equipped to do so for a long time. Its neighbors are not supine, and they show on occasion, when needed, that they are able to coalesce against Chinese actions that they judge as going too far.** At the same time, **China and those neighbors have more going constructively in trade, investment, and other relations with** each other than is at risk in this dispute.¶ **This suggests the makings of a manageable situation, even if it remains impossible to resolve for years to come. Different Asian societies are quite accustomed to living with unresolved disputes, often for centuries.**¶ In light of this reality, the United States would do well to adhere to principled positions it has already articulated, and stand for a process that is fair to all disputants and those who will be affected at the margins. To do that, Washington will need to protect its position of impartiality and avoid repetition of the misconceived State Department press statement.

No US-Sino War—Cooperation now

China-US military relations stable – RIMPAC exercise

Gady , 6-23-14. Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst and world affairs commentator. Franz-Stefan has written for the Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy Magazine, Foreign Policy Journal, American Diplomacy Quarterly, The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, and New Europe. "RIMPAC 2014 and the future of Sino-U.S. military-to-military relations", Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-gady/rimpac-2014-and-the-future_b_5521420.html

In June 2014, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will for the first time join the biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) -- **the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise**. According to the U.S.

Pacific Fleet website around 25,000 personnel from 23 nations, along with 49 surface ships, 6 submarines, and more than 200 aircraft will participate. The PLAN has dispatched the missile destroyer Haikou, the missile frigate Yueyang, the supply ship Qiandaohe and the hospital ship Peace Ark -- all in all more than 1,100 men, including a commando unit and a diving squad - towards Hawaii. According to open source intelligence the Haikou -- a Type 052C destroyer - is equipped with a modern

naval weapons system based on the American Aegis Combat System (ACS). **China's participation in the**

RIMPAC exercise is a clear signal that neither the United States nor the People's

Republic are interested in a deterioration of military-to-military relations. In fact,

RIMPAC 2014 is part of a larger effort of senior military and civilian leadership in

both countries to deepen military ties. During U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck

Hagel's last visit to China both sides agreed to an army-to-army dialogue, and an Asia-

Pacific security dialogue between the assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific security affairs and the director of the

Chinese Defense Ministry's foreign affairs office, among other things. **Chinese President Xi Jinping already**

called for a "new model of military relationship" between the two nations at the Sunnylands summit in

June 2013. **In China, participation in RIMPAC 2014 is seen as a concrete achievement in carrying out Xi**

Jinping's **call for stronger U.S.-China military relations.** PLA Deputy Navy Commander Xu Hongmeng

called PLAN involvement in RIMPAC an "important part" of stronger U.S.-China military relations. Senior Captain Zhang

Junshe of China's Naval Research Institute stated that RIMPAC would allow the PLA Navy to call into service capabilities

related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, and anti-piracy operations. According to Alexander

Sullivan, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, **China wants to** demonstrate with its

participation in RIMPAC that it is a serious regional maritime and political power -- equal to or greater than Russia and India,

who participated in the 2012 iteration -- and **to burnish its credentials on cooperation and**

confidence-building. "The PRC views closer military-military relations with the United States as a critical element

in its concept of a new type of great-power relations, which seeks to elevate the US-China relationship above others in the

region," underscores Sullivan. "The People's Liberation Army Navy gets to both advertise some new capabilities and garner

sorely needed experience in expeditionary operations and naval professionalism." Yet there is a limit to military-to-military

cooperation. "The exercise must, by U.S. law, be designed to prevent China from gleaning any warfighting advantage," so the

results for China will mostly be at the level of political symbolism and basic habits of communication between navies," states

Sullivan. The U.S. Congress when passing the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2000 (FY 2000

NDAA) prohibited contacts between both sides that would "create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure".

The NDAA lists 12 operational areas ranging from advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations to arms sales or

military-related technology transfers that are off-limits. Chinese officials continue to point out that FY 2000 NDAA hampers

deeper cooperation on a range of issues. As a consequence, China has been looking for closer ties with other great naval

powers. In May 2014, China committed a substantially larger naval force for the Sino-Russian "Joint-Sea 2014" exercise --

an annual event that has occurred for the past three years. Due to rising tensions in the South China Sea, China and Russia

have upgraded this year's joint naval drill by mixing their respective fleets into three joint battle groups. As my colleague

Greg Austin points out, retired Chinese Rear Admiral Yang Yi stated that China should aspire to emulate the naval buildup of

Russia, which according to Yi boasts the second largest navy in the world. Given China's deeper ties with Russia, RIMPAC

participation is meant to assuage the perpetual Chinese fear of encirclement by U.S. allies and to put a damper on nascent

Sino-Russian military ties that still do not run very deep (e.g., neither China nor Russia are bound by treaty to automatically

support one another militarily in case of conflict). Conversely, China will see her participation in RIMPAC 2014 as an

opportunity to undermine the apparent Anti-China coalition in East Asia and the Pacific spearheaded by the United States.

However, this should not degrade the overall stabilizing impact of RIMPAC upon naval relations between both countries.

Amidst the recent misgivings over the U.S. Justice Department's cyber espionage charges against five PLA officers, as well

as the perennial standoff in the South China Sea, **China's participation in the exercise signals that the**

military relations model to which Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Defense

Minister Chang Wanquan agreed to in April 2014 is still in place, and will remain so

for the foreseeable future.

No US-Sino War—No Motivation

China won't go to war – can't take the pain

Shambaugh 5-23-14. David Shambaugh is a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is also a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and Center for East Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford University Press, 2013). “The Illusion of Chinese Power”. The National Interest. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-illusion-chinese-power-10739>

CHINA’S MILITARY capabilities are another area where it is a partial power: increasingly a regional power, but by no means a global power. China is not able to project power outside of its Asian neighborhood (other than through its intercontinental ballistic missiles, space program and cyberwarfare capacities), and even within Asia its power-projection capacities remain limited (although growing). **It is not at all certain that China could project military power on its periphery out to five hundred nautical miles** (such as in its East or South China Sea disputes) **and sustain it long enough to prevail in a conflict. Its military forces are not battle-tested, having not fought a war since 1979.** To be sure, China’s military modernization has been advancing steadily for twenty-five years. It now has the world’s second-largest military budget (\$131.6 billion in the 2014 official budget), largest standing armed forces, scores of new advanced weapons, a navy that is sailing further and further out into the western Pacific Ocean and occasionally into the Indian Ocean, and a modest aircraft carrier. So China’s military is no pushover. It is certainly capable of defending its homeland, and could likely now wage a successful conflict over Taiwan (absent a fast and full American intervention). China is also perceived to be a regional military power in Asia and thus is altering the balance of power in the region, but **Chinese military forces still possess no conventional global power-projection capabilities. China has no bases abroad, no long-range logistics or communications lines, and rudimentary global satellite coverage. The navy is still primarily a coastal littoral force, the air force has no long-range strike ability or proven stealth capacity, and the ground forces are not configured for rapid deployment.**